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Privacy and Popularity: The Supreme Court Attempts to
Polish the Public Image of the Legal Profession in Florida
Bar v. Went For 1t Inc
Come to Major Hopkins to get full satisfaction. I win nine-
tenths of my cases. If you want to sue, if you have been sued,
I am the man to take your case. Embezzlement, highway
robbery, felonious assault, arson, and horse stealing don't
amount to shucks if you have a good lawyer behind you. My
strong point is weeping as I appeal to the jury, and I seldom
fail to clear my man. Out of eleven murder cases last year I
cleared nine of the murderers. Having been in jail no less
than four times myself, my experience cannot fail to prove of
value to my clients. Come early and avoid the rush.'
Solicitation by attorneys has become part of the vast onslaught
of commercial information that Americans are exposed to on a daily
basis. With increased levels of communication with the public,
however, comes heightened public skepticism and criticism of the
legal profession. The negative connotation of the term "ambulance
chasers" evidences the general public's suspicion of the practice of
attorney solicitation.2 While this disapproval may actually be the
result of several underlying factors,3 recent public criticism of the
legal profession routinely focuses on attorney advertising as a means
1. JESS M. BRALLIER, LAWYERS AND OTHER REPTILES 94-95 (1992) (quoting an
advertisement for Arizona lawyer Major Hopkins, circa 1895).
2. See, e.g., Ban Legalized Ambulance-Chasing, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,
July 14, 1995, at A14 (" 'Ambulance chaser' is one of the nastiest insults aimed at lawyers.
It implies ghoulish, insensitive, unscrupulous behavior by a few legal vultures who feed on
the newly injured or even the dead."); Robert A. Clifford, ABA Needs More Than
Professional Responsibility to Polish Tarnished Legal Image, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 15
("He's not an ambulance chaser. He gets there before the ambulance."). But see David
J. Nagle, The Real Enemies of Lawyer Advertising, TEX. LAW., June 14, 1993, at 20
(tracing the origin of the term "ambulance chaser" to Depression-era insurance companies
"who did not want to deal with lawyers representing injured people").
3. See, eg., Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal
Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 85, 85-95 (1994) (warning that while dissatisfaction with
the legal profession is not new, several factors-including the "hired gun" approach to
litigation, increased materialism, the focus on billable hours, and the recent litigation
explosion-have combined to make this dissatisfaction "widespread and pervasive," and
more than the "normal amount").
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to advance the lawyer's own pecuniary interests. 4  This simple
appraisal, however true it may be in some circumstances, fails to
consider important aspects of constitutionally protected liberties5 and
attorneys' professional responsibility.6 Attorneys, like other people,
have a constitutional right to free speech.7 Additionally, as officers
of the court, attorneys have an obligation to abide by the ethical
standards set forth by bar associations. The limits of these rights and
professional standards define the spectrum of actions an attorney can
take. Thus, any evaluation of the propriety of attorney advertising
must extend far beyond accusations of self-interest.
Attorney advertising receives constitutional protection as
commercial speech.' This protection has only recently been recog-
4. See, e.g., Colin Covert, Lawyers Losing Case With Public, STAR TRIB., May 29,
1994, at El ("Lawyers who advertise are sleazy ... Many see ads as a way lawyers drum
up business ...."); Scavenger Lawyers, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 1987; Solicitors Out of
Bounds, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 26,1987. But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 370-71 (1977) ("[Cynicism with regard to the legal profession may be created
by the fact that it has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the
attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with
potential clients."). For a more recent discussion of how some attorneys structure their
leisure activities to attract business, see Amy Stevens, Use Your Kids, and Other Tips for
Hungry Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1995, at BI (describing how "practitioner[s] of the
booming trade known as legal marketing consulting" direct clients to "[t]hink of every
social encounter as an opportunity to do business").
5. One such liberty is the freedom of speech. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 379-82. The
First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr Preamble (1994) ("[A]
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality
of services rendered by the legal profession."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY Canon 2 (1981) ("A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty
to make legal counsel available."). The organized bar has long recognized the disparity
between the need for legal services and their availability:
A wide gap separates the need for legal services and its satisfaction, as numerous
studies reveal. Looked at from the side of the layman, one reason for the gap
is poverty and the consequent inability to pay legal fees. Another set of reasons
is ignorance and fear on the part of those who could pay. There is ignorance of
the need for and the value of legal services, and ignorance of where to find a
dependable lawyer. There is fear of the mysterious processes and delays of the
law, and there is fear of overreaching and overcharging by lawyers ....
Elliott E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REv. 438, 438 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 379 (holding a regulation prohibiting price advertising
by attorneys unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
8. See id at 367-79. Some early commentators distinguished between the terms
"advertising" and "solicitation" by categorizing the former as "activities which seek to
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nized and attorneys have responded rapidly.' This protection often
conflicts with the ethical standards developed by the various state bar
associations.' A ringing, and often constitutionally insufficient,
justification for restrictions on attorney solicitation is the bar's interest
in maintaining the professionalism and dignity of attorneys." The
removal of some of these restrictions has undeniably provided the
public with greater access to attorneys and removed some of the
mystery surrounding the profession. 2
inform, notify or persuade the public... without the use of a person-to-person encounter"
and the latter as "similar activities involving personal contact." Note, Advertising,
Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal CounselAvailable, 81 YALE L.J. 1181,
1181 n.4 (1972); see David A. Rabin, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regulation
After Primus and Ohralik, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 144,144 n.1 (1978) ("There is often only
a very fine line between advertisement and solicitation."). While the Court has found
complete prohibition of the form of "solicitation" contemplated by these works to be
constitutionally acceptable, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the
distinctions have generally blurred and this Note will use the terms interchangeably to
refer to attorney conduct, other than "in-person solicitation," aimed at entering business
arrangements with potential clients.
9. Prior to the Court's decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 728, 770 (1976), commercial speech, of which attorney
advertising is a subcategory, did not receive First Amendment protection. The decision
in Bates extended this protection to attorney advertising for the first time. See Bates, 433
U.S. at 384. Legal advertisements currently appear on television and radio broadcasts, in
newspapers and legal periodicals, and even on billboards.
10. See, eg., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,478-80 (1988) (invalidating
complete prohibition on targeted direct-mail solicitation); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-47 (1985) (protecting attorney's right to solicit
clients known to have a specific legal problem through newspaper advertisement); In re
RMJ, 455 U.S. 191, 204-07 (1982) (striking a limitation on the permissible content of an
attorney's newspaper advertisement). For an analysis of the In re RMJ decision and a
predictive application of its reasoning to direct-mail solicitation, see Jerry Elliot, The First
Amendment, In Re RMJ, and State Regulation of Direct Mail Lawyer Advertising, 34
BAYLOR L. REv. 411,424-40 (1982).
11. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648 ("[T]he mere possibility that some members of the
population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify suppressing it.
The same must hold true for advertising that some members of the bar find beneath their
dignity."); Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 ("[W]e find the postulated connection between
advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained.").
12. In Zauderer, the attorney presented testimony from two witnesses who admitted
that they would not have learned of their legal claims if they had not seen his adver-
tisement. 471 U.S. at 634; see Lawyer Solicitation: Does It Invade Privacy, N.J. L.J. at 25
(reprint of commentary of Stephen Gillers, professor, New York University Law School)
("I was in practice in New York when Bates was decided and saw with my own eyes that
the effect of advertising was to reduce the price of routine legal services by as much as 50
percent or more."). For an economic argument in favor of advertising, see Geoffery C.
Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of
Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983). Professor Hazard views legal services as
falling into two categories, standardized and individualized. Id. at 1090-91. Regarding
standardized legal services, those involving relatively low risk to the client, he argues that
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The Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of
restrictions on lawyer solicitation of accident victims in Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc 3 The Court held that a thirty-day ban on direct-
mail solicitation of accident victims and their families was
constitutionally permissible.'" This Note presents the Court's
decision in light of the traditional prohibitions on lawyer advertising
and the recent constitutional protection afforded it."5 Also, this Note
discusses the historical basis for these proscriptions and examines
essential decisions regarding both the commercial speech doctrine and
its application to attorney advertising. 6 Finally, this Note analyzes
the Court's decision in light of precedent and, particularly, questions
the wisdom of allowing regulations to be justified on the basis of a
potential improvement of the legal profession's image.'
7
The regulations at issue in Went For It, Inc. created a thirty-day
prohibition on direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their
families by attorneys.'" The first part of the challenged regulation
provides:
[A] lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent
... a written communication to a prospective client for the
purposes of obtaining professional employment if: (A) the
written communication concerns an action for personal
injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident
or disaster involving the person to whom the communication
is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident
or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing
of the communication.'
advertising could lower costs by increasing consumer awareness and allowing producers
to achieve economies of scale. Id. at 1090-98. Conversely, advertising individualized legal
services involving high client risk is not cost effective because it "cannot communicate
information likely to influence potential purchasers." Id. at 1105.
13. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
14. Id. at 2381.
15. See infra notes 18-78 and accompanying text.
16.' See infra notes 79-195 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 196-250 and accompanying text.
18. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2374. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the
restrictions in 1990 after the Florida Bar petitioned it to amend the rules regulating
attorney conduct. The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990). The Florida Bar made these
recommendations after completing a two-year study of the effects of lawyer advertising on
public opinion. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
19. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7A(b)(1).
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The second part of the regulation states:
A lawyer shall not accept referrals from a lawyer referral
service unless the service: (1) engages in no communication
with the public and in no direct contact with prospective
clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if the communication or contact were made
by the lawyer.'
A Florida attorney and his personally owned referral service,
Went For It, Inc., challenged these restrictions as violations of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.2' In request-
ing injunctive relief, the plaintiffs asserted that they regularly engaged
in targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident victims or their
survivors within thirty days after accidents and wished to continue the
practice They contended that the rules were unconstitutional as
content-based restrictions on commercial speech that did not serve a
substantial government interest.' The courts below found that
Florida's asserted interests in protecting the heightened sensitivities
and privacy of its citizens, and the tranquility of their homes, were
insufficient to justify such a "prophylactic rule."'24 The United States
Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor 6 stated that the
regulations passed constitutional scrutiny under the Central Hudson
test for content-based restrictions on commercial speech.27 Purely
20. Id at 4-7.8(a).
21. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1544-48 (M.D. Fla. 1992). The
attorney, G. Stewart McHenry, was subsequently disbarred for unrelated events, Florida
Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1992), and another Florida attorney was
substituted in his place. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
22. See Went For It, Inc, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
23. Both the district court, 808 F. Supp. at 1547-48, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (11th Cir. 1994), rejected
the government's assertion that the regulation should be upheld as a reasonable time,
place and manner restriction. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district judge in
holding that the restriction was "unambiguously content-based," noting that it prohibited
letters concerning personal injury actions but allowed letters concerning probate
representation. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d at 1044-45; see McHenry v. Florida Bar,
808 F. Supp. at 1547-48. The time, place and manner analysis is explained in Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,294 (1984). The Supreme Court did
not consider this argument.
24. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1042-44; McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1545-47.
25. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
26. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Breyer. Id at 2373.
27. Id. at 2381. For an explanation of this analysis, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-71 (1980). See also infra notes 144-51 and
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commercial speech that is truthful, nondeceptive, and concerns a
lawful activity receives some constitutional protection, albeit to a
lesser degree than political speech, which is "at the First
Amendment's core. ' ' The Florida Bar did not contend that the
proposed letters would be untruthful or misleading, or that they
related to unlawful activities.29 Under Central Hudson, the Court
had to determine if the restriction: (1) served a substantial
government interest; (2) directly and materially advanced that interest;
and (3) was "narrowly drawn. '" 30
In considering the first part of the analysis, the majority agreed
with the Florida Bar that the state had a substantial interest in
"protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and
their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers., 3
1
The Court observed that the State's interest in protecting the privacy
and tranquility of the home from unwanted intrusions had consistently
been recognized as a substantial state interest.32 The majority also
mentioned the broad authority with which states may regulate
professions in order to protect" 'public health, safety, and other valid
interests.' ,,3 The historically strong protection accorded the privacy
accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson analysis).
28. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2375. Commercial speech enjoys " 'a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible
in the realm of noncommercial expression.' " Board of Trustees of State University of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978)). It is well settled that the government may regulate commercial speech
"that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading." Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376; see
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64.
29. Went For It, Inc, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. When questioned about the content of the
proposed communication at oral argument, counsel for the Florida Bar responded: "That's
not in the record ... and I don't know the answer to that question." Id. at 2384
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 25).
30. Id. at 2376 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65).
31. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 8, 25-27). The Court noted that the Central
Hudson analysis did not allow it to " 'supplant the precise interests put forward by the
State with other suppositions.' " Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798
(1993)). The Court also recognized:
The regulation, then, is an effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida
lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that, the Bar maintains, "is
universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its
intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their
families."
Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 28).
32. Went For 14 Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (citing Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799; Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
33. Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
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and tranquility of citizens within their homes persuaded the majority
that this interest was substantial.34
In considering whether the thirty-day prohibition advanced these
interests in a "direct and material"3 way, Justice O'Connor noted
that the State's burden would not be satisfied by speculation and
conjecture, but would require a showing that the restriction would
alleviate the alleged harms "to a material degree."3 6 Based on the
results of a two-year study of attorney advertising and solicitation, the
majority believed that the restriction would do so.37  The study
contained statistical and anecdotal evidence "supporting the Bar's
contentions that the Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in
the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion, on privacy that
reflects poorly upon the profession."3  The anecdotal record
contained examples of the media's negative portrayal of direct-mail
solicitation, as well as comments from several disgruntled Floridians
whose families had received such solicitations at traumatic times.O
Noting that Went For It, Inc. had failed to substantively contest the
study's results, Justice O'Connor concluded that the evidence
34. Id. at 2376-77.
35. Id. at 2377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the past, the Court struck down a
restriction supported by substantial state interests because the state failed to submit
statistical or anecdotal evidence showing that the restriction advanced the interests in a
material manner. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800-02. But cf Lloyd B. Snyder, Rhetoric,
Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by Attorneys, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV.
357, 358-60 (1995) (arguing that in the context of restrictions on attorney advertising, the
Court has given strong consideration to governmental claims that were unsupported by
evidence).
37. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2377.
38. Idt Of the general population surveyed, 54% felt that contacting persons
concerning accidents or similar events was a violation of privacy. Id. (citing Magid
Associates, Attitudes & Opinions Toward Direct MailAdvertising by Attorneys (Dec. 1987),
Summary of Record, App. C(4), p.6). In a random sample of direct-mail attorney
advertisement recipients,
45% believed that direct-mail solicitation is designed to take advantage of gullible
or unstable people; 34% found such tactics annoying or irritating; 26% found it
an invasion of your privacy; 24% reported that it made you angry....
Significantly, 27% of the direct mail recipients reported that their regard for the
legal profession and for the judicial process as a whole was lower as a result of
receiving direct mail.
Id. (citing Magid Associates, Attitudes & Opinions Toward Direct Mail Advertising by
Attorneys (Dec. 1987), Summary of Record, App. C(4), p.7 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
39. Id. at 2377-78. The citizens were "appalled and angered," "astounded," "very
angry," and viewed the practice as "despicable and inexcusable," "beyond comprehension,"
and "of the rankest form of ambulance chasing." Id.
1996] 1687
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demonstrated that the restrictions materially advanced the State's
interest.4
The majority distinguished regulations stricken in Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Association4' and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.42 The majority concluded that Shapero was not controlling
because the state interest asserted there was the prevention of
overreaching rather than the protection of privacy, and the ban in
question prohibited "all direct-mail solicitations, whatever the time
frame and whoever the recipient."'43 The contested restrictions, in
contrast, targeted the intrusion occurring when attorneys "confront"
the recently injured or bereaved.' Further, the Went For It, Inc.
majority was not persuaded by the reasoning presented in Bolger that
" 'recipients of objectionable mailings ... may effectively avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes.' "' This technique could not be employed to avoid the
"outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession" caused
by direct mail solicitation in the wake of an accident.46 Although the
restriction on mailing "objectionable contraceptive material" in Bolger
was unacceptable, the "unrefuted empirical and anecdotal" evidence
presented by the Florida Bar justified the thirty-day ban.47
Having found that the Florida Bar satisfied the first two parts of
the Central Hudson analysis, the majority next considered the
"relationship between the Florida Bar's interests and the means
chosen to serve them."48 Went For It, Inc. challenged the restriction
as overinclusive because it failed to "distinguish between victims in
terms of the severity of their injuries," and thus prohibited solicitation
of victims with minor injuries and correspondingly low levels of
40. Id
41. 486 U.S. 466, 472-80 (1988) (striking a complete prohibition on direct-mail
advertising by attorneys).
42. 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (striking a prohibition on mailing of advertisements for
contraceptive paraphernalia).
43. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2378. The Court noted that because a privacy
interest was not asserted in Shapero, the empirical showing made on that issue was
irrelevant. Id at 2378-79.
44. Id at 2379. Justice O'Connor wrote: "[T]he untargeted letter involves no willful
or knowing affront to or invasion of the tranquility of bereaved or injured individuals and
simply does not cause the same kind of reputational harm to the profession .... ." Id.
45. Id at 2379 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72).
46. Id. ("The Bar is concerned not with citizens' 'offense' in the abstract, but with the
demonstrable detrimental effects that such 'offense' has on the profession it regulates.").
47. IdL
48. Id at 2380.
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grief.49 The majority found it "hard to imagine the contours of a
regulation" making this distinction and noted the difficulty of
categorically parsing injuries based on relative grie"50 Additionally,
Went For It, Inc. contended that the regulation would prevent people
from learning their legal options." The ban's limited time period
and the various alternative informational channels, however,
persuaded the majority that the restriction would not be a large
obstacle to Floridians in need of legal advice5 2 Finding that the
thirty-day prohibition was a reasonable fit for the State's asserted
interest, the majority upheld the regulation against the First
Amendment challenge.5 3
In dissent, Justice Kennedy charged the majority with
"unsettl[ing] leading First Amendment precedents, at the expense of
those victims most in need of legal assistance."5 4 Characterizing the
majority's concerns for the victims' privacy and the legal profession's
reputation as "misplaced and self-defeating," Justice Kennedy
maintained that these concerns did not warrant the restriction in light
of the need to "investigate the occurrence, identify witnesses, and
preserve evidence" in the immediate aftermath of an accident. 5 In
this respect, victims who did not learn of the availability of legal
services through more "sophisticated and indirect" means could be
taken advantage of by other parties with superior knowledge of or
access to legal representation. 6 The dissent agreed that the Central
Hudson analysis was necessary but disputed each of the majority's
conclusions.5 7
Noting that the dangers of "overreaching and undue influence"
that accompany in-person solicitation do not exist in direct-mail
solicitation, the dissent considered the Bar's asserted privacy interest
49. Id.
50. Id. ("The Bar's rule is reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective of eliminating
targeted mailings whose type and timing are a source of distress to Floridians, distress that
has caused many of them to lose respect for the legal profession.").
51. Id.
52. 1& at 2381.
53. I& ("The Bar has substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from
invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession
that such repeated invasions have engendered.").
54. Id at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. 1d at 2381-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. 1 at 2382-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "As is often true when the law makes little
sense, it is not first principles but their interpretation and application that have gone
awry." Id. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1996] 1689
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invalid.58 The Court had recognized the privacy interest, generally,
but the dissent argued that" 'the mere possibility that some members
of the population might find advertising... offensive cannot justify
suppressing it.' "19 According to Justice Kennedy, the privacy
interest had traditionally been a justification only when the offended
audience was "captive, " which mail recipients are not.' To avoid
offensive material, he felt, all that was required of recipients was to
take the " 'short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash
can.' 1161 In his view, considering the restriction's resulting prejudice
to the rights of would-be recipients to "petition the courts for redress
of grievances," this was an acceptable burden. 2
Further, the dissent addressed another interest that had per-
suaded the majority-"protecting the reputation and dignity of the
legal profession."'  The dissent criticized the majority's conclusion
that the prohibited solicitation constituted an "unethical or improper"
practice and thereby created unpopularity for the profession.'
Justice Kennedy noted that while unpopularity would spring from
unethical behavior, "direct solicitation may serve vital purposes and
promote the administration of justice."' By regulating speech
deemed offensive by some-in the name of the profession-the
Florida Bar was essentially "manipulating the public's opinion by
suppressing speech that informs us how the legal system works., 66
In considering the second prong of the Central Hudson analysis,
the dissent did not agree that the restrictions advanced the State's
asserted interest in a direct and material way.67 Particularly, the
dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the "document" containing
the statistical and anecdotal evidence. Unsatisfied by the "[lack of]
actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selection procedures,
58. d. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466,
475 (1988)).
59. l at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)).
60. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 72 (1983)).
62. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2383-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was apparently unwilling
to call the collection of information submitted by the Florida Bar a "survey."
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no explanation of methodology, and no discussion of excluded
results,"'69 Justice Kennedy noted that the Bar's burden on this issue
required more than "a few pages of self-serving and unsupported
statements."7  Further, the dissent determined that even if this
record's validity were accepted, the "essential thrust" of the material
was directed to the reputational concerns of the Bar and did not make
"clear that this regulation advances the interest of protecting persons
who are suffering trauma and grief"'
Finally, the dissent concluded that the "wild disproportion
between the harm supposed and the speech ban enforced," signified
the regulation was not narrowly drawn.72 In the case of lesser
injuries the dissent argued that there was little chance that a
solicitation letter would cause victims to become distraught.73 With
regard to more serious injuries, the dissent noted the necessity of
"prompt" legal representation.74 Regardless of the feasibility of
drawing a regulation that differentiated between these classes of
injuries, the dissent refused to agree that "in all or most cases an
attorney's advice would be unwelcome."'7  In contrast to those
victims whose education or familiarity with the legal system allowed
them quick access, the dissent claimed that those victims who lacked
access to legal representation due to their "lack [of] education,
linguistic ability, or familiarity with the legal system" would benefit
from direct solicitation.76 By restricting communication in both
instances, the majority had prejudiced the legal rights of "the very
persons who most need legal advice. 7 7  Because the restriction
"depriv[ed] accident victims of information which may be critical to
their right to make a claim for compensation," the dissent contended
69. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("There is no description of the statistical universe
or scientific framework that permits any productive use of the information ...
70. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Ia- (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. 1& (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. I& (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that the majority's
suggestion that alternative channels of communication were available disclosed "latent
protectionism for the established bar" and conceded the "necessity for the very
representation the attorneys solicit and the State seeks to ban." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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that the thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation of all accident
victims did not satisfy the "reasonable fit" requirement. 71
The Went For It, Inc. decision marks the first time a restriction
on written communication by attorneys has been upheld by the Court
since 1977, when constitutional protection of attorney advertising was
recognized in Bates v. State Bar .79 Historically, attorney advertising
and commercial speech were not protected by the First
Amendment. 0 Recently, however, the Court acknowledged that
both commercial speech8' and attorney advertising 2 deserve some
protection and defined the extent of this protection.
Went For It, Inc. arises from a line of cases in direct conflict with
traditional views regarding attorney advertising. Indeed, proscriptions
on attorney advertising have existed for centuries." Some proscrip-
tions were inspired by the intimate nature of the English bar in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an intimacy that would have
been impossible "for men who were continually blowing their
professional horns and plotting to steal away one another's clients.8S4
This atmosphere discouraged advertising, as the respect of the
lawyer's peers was critical to his success. However, as the practice of
law developed, these internal incentives against advertising were
eliminated 5 and many nineteenth-century American attorneys
advertised their services.8 6 Nevertheless, proscriptions on adver-
tising, viewed by many as a component of the high ethical standards
necessary to maintain the valued "professionalism" of attorneys,'
soon resurfaced.
78. See id. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
79. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
80. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (addressing commercial
speech); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (same). Attorney advertising,
which is essentially a proposal to enter a business arrangement, is considered commercial
speech. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-66.
81. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
82. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
83. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 210-15 (1953).
84. Id. at 210 ("They were a select fraternity who lived together and met one another
every day, both at dinner and in the court, on a friendly basis.").
85. itL at 210-11. As the familiarity among members of the legal profession
evaporated and societal emphasis on competition developed, attorneys became less reliant
on their peers in their quest for professional and personal success. See id. at 210-12.
86. See Hazard et al., supra note 12, at 1085 n.2. For a brief discussion of famous
American attorneys, including Abraham Lincoln, who advertised in the 1800s, see id.
87. See DRINKER, supra note 83, at 214-15. By decreasing public confidence in
attorneys, it was argued, advertising would hurt the profession's ability to render high
quality services, and thus adversely affect the administration of justice. Id. at 211-12.
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The American Bar Association first adopted standards
prohibiting attorney advertising in 19088 and continued to dis-
courage most forms of advertising for many years.8 9 These standards
were greatly influenced by the ABA's goal of maintaining "profes-
sionalism" within the legal profession." Although some alterations
in the rules against advertising were made to allow the publication of
authorized legal listings intended to increase public access to the legal
profession, the ABA and the organized bar historically were strongly
opposed to attorney advertising.9 Case law concerning advertising
and commercial speech in general supported the proposition that
states could regulate attorney advertising at will.
Prior to 1976, the review of regulations on commercial speech
had been guided by a terse statement made by Justice Roberts in
Valentine v. Chrestensen.92 In upholding a ban on "purely commer-
cial" speech, the Court recognized constitutional protection of the
"freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion,"
but reasoned that "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."93  As a
subcategory of commercial speech, attorney advertising was thereafter
considered a proper subject of the traditional restrictions.
The Court departed from this doctrine in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.94 Although the
Court had previously suggested that the Valentine rule was ob-
solete,9' the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy completely
88. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908).
89. DRINKER, supra note 83, at 212-81.
90. See id. at 212-15. Other evils traditionally thought to be inherent in legal
advertising included the stirring up of litigation, undue influence, and the "temptation and
probability that the lawyers who advertise and solicit would use improper means to make
good their extravagant inducements." Id. at 214.
91. Ld. at 211-20; cf. Snyder, supra note 36, at 360-67 (arguing that while the organized
bar has restricted advertising and client solicitation by attorneys "under the guise of
protecting professional values," the establishment's real interest is the preservation of the
status quo).
92. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
93. Id. at 54; see also Breard v. Alexandria 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (upholding an
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions due to its
"commercial feature").
94. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975) (striking down a Virginia
statute prohibiting the circulation of any publication designed to encourage or promote
abortion). In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court noted that the subject matter
in Bigelow was a matter of "clear 'public interest,' "and that this circumstance might have
left "[s]ome fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a 'commercial speech'
exception." 425 U.S. at 760 (quoting Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822).
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abrogated it. The Court inquired "whether speech which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction' is so removed from any
'exposition of ideas,' and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government,' that it lacks all protection.0 6 In striking down the
statute, which prohibited price advertising by pharmacists, the Court
reasoned that to achieve the proper allocation of resources in a free-
enterprise economy, society has a strong interest in the free flow of
information as a mechanism to inform buyers and sellers of their
options.97 Thus, the Court declared that commercial speech, at least
with regard to pure price advertising of products, deserved First
Amendment protection."
The Court also considered the argument that allowing such
advertising would adversely affect both the quality of services
provided by pharmacists and the reputation of the profession.99 The
Court discounted these concededly valid interests by recognizing that
"high professional standards ... are guaranteed by the close
regulation to which pharmacists .. . are subject."'" Further, the
unscrupulous pharmacist would not be deterred from cutting comers
merely because he could not advertise.10' In trying to protect its
citizens from a decline in professional standards, Virginia employed
means that rested "in large measure on the advantages of their being
kept in ignorance."'" Criticizing this approach, the Court suggested
that the State's fears could be alleviated because "people will perceive
their own best interests, if only they are well enough informed."' 3
The Court did not foreclose regulation on commercial speech
entirely. The State retained the power to enact reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions, as well as the authority to prohibit
96. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting, in order, Pittsburg Press
Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,385 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). For one
commentator's view in support of this decision, see Thomas M. Schneider, Prior Restraints
and Restrictions on Advertising After Virginia Pharmacy Board: The Commercial Speech
Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REV. 64, 74-87 (1978).
97. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. Given the First Amendment's
strong protection for dissemination of political speech, the interest of the individual
consumer "in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
98. a d at 765.
99. Id at 766.
100. Id at 768.
101. d at 769.
102. Id
103. Id at 770.
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commercial speech that was false or misleading or concerned an
illegal activity."t 4 With this in mind, the Court explicitly limited its
ruling to pharmacists, leaving open the constitutionality of advertising
regulation of other professions. 5 However, as predicted by Justice
Rehnquist in dissent, this extension of logic was not far off."
One year later in Bates v. State Bar,'" the Court relied on the
reasoning in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to upset traditional
ideology and extend First Amendment protection to attorney
advertising.' The challenged regulation prohibited attorneys from
advertising " 'through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio
or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or
telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity.' ""0
Two Arizona attorneys had violated the rule by placing a newspaper
advertisement offering "legal services at very reasonable fees, and
list[ing] their fees for certain services.""' The Court considered and
dismissed six justifications for the complete ban on price advertising
by attorneys."'
In considering the first purported justification-advertising's
adverse effect on professionalism-the Court found "the postulated
connection between advertising and the erosion of true profes-
sionalism to be severely strained."" The Court reasoned that price
104. Id. at 771-72.
105. Id- at 773 n.25 ("Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized
products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the
consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake
certain kinds of advertising.").
106. Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist Criticized the majority for
ignoring past constitutional interpretation: "[Tihere is certainly nothing in the United
States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of
Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession." Id. at 784
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting.) He also argued that the Court had created a standard whereby,
absent a showing that communication was untruthful or misleading, the states were unable
to "restrict in any way commercial efforts." Id. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
108. Id. at 363-79.
109. Id. at 355 (quoting Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1976)). The Arizona rules did permit qualified legal assistance
organizations and their members to employ means of dignified commercial publicity. Id.
n.5.
110. Id. at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 368-79; see Tiffany S. Meyer & Robert E. Smith, Attorney Advertising: Bates
and a Beginning, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 443-56 (1978); Note, Attorney Advertising Is
Commercial Speech Protected by the First Amendment: Bates v. State Bar, 37 MD. L. REV.
350, 361-71 (1977).
112. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
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advertising might provide better access to the legal system to those
persons who, although they recognized a need for legal services, failed
to obtain counsel "because of the feared price of services or because
of an inability to locate a competent attorney."' Further, adver-
tising's allegedly negative effect on the public reputation of the
profession was questionable; the dignified engineering, banking, and
medical professions had embraced advertising without adverse
reputational consequences."' Noting the origin of the rules against
attorney advertising,"' the Court determined that "habit and
tradition" could not justify such an infringement on First Amendment
liberties."6
The Court responded to the next justification-the inherently
misleading nature of attorney advertising-by stating that in the case
of "routine" legal services,"7 the advertisement would not be
misleading "so long as the attorney does the necessary work at the
advertised price.""' The argument that legal services are inherently
unique and thus do not lend themselves to standardized rates was
weakened by the existence of the Arizona State Bar's Legal Service
Program, in which participating attorneys agreed to perform certain
services at standardized rates."9 Further, the fact that advertising
could not provide a "complete foundation" for attorney selection did
not mean that advertisements did not provide at least "some of the
relevant information needed to reach an informed decision. ' 120 To
this end, the Court "view[ed] as dubious any justification that [was]
based on the benefits of public ignorance. ',2
Next, the Court considered advertising's effect on the ad-
ministration of justice, particularly the contention that advertising
113. lit at 370. In light of the American Bar Association's MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1976), which encouraged lawyers to reach a fee
agreement with clients "[a]s soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed," the Court
observed the inconsistency that would be created by requiring prompt disclosure of the
"commercial basis" of the relationship "once the client is in the office" while condemning
the "candid revelation of the same information before he arrives at that office." Bates, 433
U.S. at 369.
114. Bates, 433 U.S. at 369-70.
115. Id. at 371; see supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
116. Bates, 433 U.S. at 371.
117. Id. at 372. These "routine" services included "the uncontested divorce, the simple
adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like." Id.
118. Id. at 373.
119. Id.
120. IL at 374.
121. Id. at 375 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976)).
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would "stir[] up litigation."' Given the Court's opposition to the
notion that "it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently
than to redress it by legal action," the possibility that advertising
would "encourage the assertion of legal rights" actually weighed in
favor of advertising."z Similarly, advertising's alleged adverse
economic effect was discounted by the reality that "[t]he ban ...
serves to increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller of
acceptable ability."'" Given these two undesirable results of the
ban-reduced access and less competition-the Court held that
"allowing restrained advertising would be in accord with the bar's
obligation to 'facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers,
and to assist in making legal services fully available.' ""a
Finally, the Court considered the potentially detrimental effect of
advertising on the quality of legal service and the difficulties of
enforcing a more limited restriction."' The Court did not agree that
restricting advertising would deter "shoddy work" and observed that
"attorney[s]... inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule
on advertising."' 27 Further, the bar's concern about the additional
burden that overseeing advertising placed on bar agencies was
mitigated by the Court's belief that most attorneys would continue to
behave with "integrity and honor. '' 2
122. Id.
123. Id. at 375-76.
124. Id. at 377. The result of the ban was to remove an incentive for attorneys to price
competitively. The Court noted that with regard to products, price advertising had actually
served to lower retail prices dramatically. Id.
125. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY EC 2-1 (1976)).
126. Id. at 378-79.
127. Id. at 378.
128. Id. at 379 ("It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising
to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to
assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort."). Realizing the
"problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and non-deceptive advertising,"
especially in the context of advertising legal services, the Court suggested that attorney
advertising could be subject to some regulation. Id. at 383-84. Justice Powell, in dissent,
was unpersuaded that price advertisement of routine legal services could exist without
being inherently misleading. Id. at 391-95 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He conceded that alternative forms of attorney advertising could be nondeceptive,
and found the majority's suggestion that advertisements might be required to contain a
"warning or disclaimer... so as to assure that the consumer is not misled" consistent with
his opinion that "price advertisement of legal services ... will require the most
particularized regulation." Id. at 402 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, Justice Powell would have allowed legal advertising limited to those forms that could
be presented in a nondeceptive manner. Id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist, writing separately, was "unwilling to take even one
step down the 'slippery slope' " away from the "constitutionally sound and practically
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With its decision in Bates, the Court took a major step, but the
limits of the First Amendment's protection of attorney advertising
remained uncertain. The scope of this protection was developed in
a series of cases that both clarified the Court's doctrinal analysis of
commercial speech and addressed regulations of attorney advertising
within this framework. During this evolving process, the Court had
the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of regulations on two
distinct forms of attorney advertising: in-person solicitation in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association and solicitation by letter "of
a client for a non-profit organization which, as its primary purpose,
renders legal services" in In re Primus.3 ' Though these cases were
decided on distinct grounds, they foreshadowed the Court's general
treatment of regulations on attorney advertising."'
The Court upheld a prohibition on in-person solicitation in
Ohralik on the basis that in-person solicitation presented the danger
of undue influence and overreaching that did not exist in the adver-
tisement considered in Bates.12 Despite the constitutional protec-
tion recognized in recent cases, the Court noted that the commercial
nature of the proposed transaction reduced "the level of appropriate
judicial scrutiny."'3 Observing that due to the profession's role in
the " 'primary governmental function of administering justice' " the
states traditionally had broad authority to regulate the profession, the
Court looked to particular state interests to justify the restriction."3
The indisputable contention that Ohio had a "legitimate and indeed
'compelling' interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that
involve[d] fraud, undue influence, intimidation, [and] over-
reaching,"'3 5 coupled with the increased potential for overreaching
"when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay
person,' 3 6 convinced the Court that a prophylactic ban on in-person
workable" Valentine rule, which withheld First Amendment protection from commercial
speech. Id. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
129. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
130. 436 U.S. 412, 420 (1978).
131. For an extensive discussion of these decisions, see Rabin, supra note 8, at 152-87
(proposing liberalization of then-existing regulations on legal advertising).
132. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-59.
133. Id. at 457.
134. Id. at 460-62 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
135. Id. at 462.
136. Id. at 465.
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solicitation was justified.'37  Although the constitutionality of
prophylactic bans on in-person solicitation have not been challenged
since Ohralik, states have had only minimal success in restricting
other forms of truthful, nondeceptive advertising. 8
In In re Primus, the Court specifically considered whether South
Carolina could discipline an attorney for " 'solicit[ing] a client for a
non-profit [legal services] organization ... where [the attorney's]
associate is a staff counsel for the non-profit organization.' "I" The
attorney had sent a letter to an individual to whom the attorney had
given unsolicited legal advice; the letter advised the individual that the
ACLU, with whom both the attorney and her associates were
affiliated, would provide free legal assistance."4 The Court sub-
jected the regulation to exacting scrutiny because the attorney was
"seeking to further political and ideological goals through as-
sociational activity."'' Under this standard, the restriction swept too
broadly by proscribing solicitation that did not contain "undue
influence, overreaching, misrepresentation," or any of the other
dangers that the state claimed to fear.42 The Court distinguished
the letter from in-person solicitation on grounds that it permitted the
recipient to make a deliberate decision, "involved no appreciable
invasion of privacy," and afforded no "significant opportunity for
overreaching or coercion."'43 Although the Court struck down the
regulation on First Amendment associational grounds rather than
commercial speech grounds, it became apparent that allowable
137. Id. at 467. The Court also noted that less restrictive limitations on in-person
solicitation would be difficult for the state to police, due to the lack of evidence. Id at
466.
138. See Snyder, supra note 36, at 364-67. Disclosure requirements on attorney
advertising have been upheld because the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech stems from the value of the information contained therein; requiring disclosure of
more information, when "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception
of consumers," is not repugnant to that protection. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
139. 436 U.S. 412, 427 (1978) (quoting In reSmith, 233 S.E.2d 301, 306 (S.C. 1977)).
140. Ld. at 414.
141. Il; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431-33 (1963) (holding that the
NAACP's solicitation of prospective litigants for the purpose of furthering the civil rights
objectives of the organization invoked associational freedoms at the core of First
Amendment protection, which required that regulations of this activity pass "exacting
scrutiny").
142. Primus, 436 U.S. at 432-33.
143. Id. at 435. Further, the existence of written communication would decrease the
difficulty of policing valid regulations of this type of attorney advertising. Id. at 435-36.
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regulation of attorney advertising would require a strong showing by
the state.
Two years later, the Court clarified its analytical framework for
testing the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion.'" In striking down a complete ban on promotional adver-
tising by electric utilities, the Court set forth a four-part test. First,
because constitutional protection for commercial speech is based on
its informational function, communication that is deceptive or related
to an illegal activity may be freely banned. 4 If the communication
falls into neither of these categories, a restriction will be
constitutionally valid only if it: (1) serves a "substantial" governmen-
tal interest,"46 (2) "directly advances the governmental interest
asserted,"'47 and (3) "is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest."'148 Applying this analysis, the Central Hudson
144. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
145. Id at 563-64. The extent to which the First Amendment permits prohibition of
attorney communication that is misleading was clarified recently by the Court's decision
in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990). In striking
down ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(a)(3) (1988), which
forbade attorneys from holding themselves out as "certified" or "a specialist," the plurality
conceded that inserting those claims on an attorney's letterhead was potentially misleading.
Peel, 496 U.S. at 106-11; id at 111 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 118
(White, J., dissenting). While inherently misleading commercial speech can be freely
banned, however, the Court was not willing to extend this principle to cover commercial
speech with only the potential to deceive, at least when the risk could be averted by
narrower regulations such as a disclosure requirement. Id at 110 n.17; id. at 111
(Marshall, J., concurring). Thus, if commercial speech with the potential to mislead can
be made nondeceptive by a disclosure requirement, it cannot automatically be restricted
under the first part of the Central Hudson analysis.
146. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 566.
147. Id. at 564-66. The Court noted that in both Bates and Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, restrictions indirectly advancing a state interest were struck down. Id. at 564.
The Court further elaborated upon this requirement in Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
800-01 (1993), where the Court struck down a regulation that prohibited in-person
solicitation by accountants. Finding that the State had failed to satisfy its burden of
showing that the restriction directly advanced a substantial governmental interest, as no
statistical or anecdotal evidence was offered, the Court stated: "This burden is not
satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain
a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Id.
148. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66. In requiring speech restrictions to be
"narrowly drawn," the First Amendment does not allow complete suppression of
"information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve [the state's] interest
as well." Id. at 565. The Court suggested that, despite its recent rulings invalidating
complete prohibitions of certain types of commercial speech, "more carefully drawn
restrictions" could survive. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701-02 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
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Court accepted as substantial New York's interest in energy conser-
vation 49 and found that the regulation "directly advanced" this
interest. 50 The Court struck down the "complete suppression of
Central Hudson's advertising," however, due to the "absence of a
showing that more limited speech regulation would be ineffec-
tive.''5 Thus, a standard by which to evaluate commercial speech
restrictions had developed; the standard's application to the context
of legal advertising would require further refinement.
The Court first applied this commercial speech standard in the
context of attorney advertising in In re RMJ1 2  The regulation
under scrutiny was a revision of Missouri's restrictions on attorney
advertising that permitted certain forms of advertising and allowed
only certain categories of information to be advertised."3 Further,
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976)). Justice Rehnquist,
continuing to disagree with the Court's determination that commercial speech should be
afforded any First Amendment protection, was particularly critical of the majority's
inclusion and interpretation of this requirement: "The final part of the Court's test thus
leaves room for so many hypothetical 'better' ways that any ingenious lawyer will surely
seize on one of them.... ." ld. at 599-600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, in Board
of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989), the Court
distinguished the requirement that commercial speech regulations be "narrowly drawn"
from the "least-restrictive-means" requirement employed in other contexts. Because the
stricter "least-restrictive-means" standard was inconsistent with the subordinate position
held by commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values, the Court interpreted
the "narrowly drawn" component to require a "fit between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope
is in proportion to the interest served." Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Mark A. Conrad, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox-The
Dawn of a New Age of Commercial Speech Regulation of Tobacco and Alcohol, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 61, 85-88 (1990) (summarizing the Court's constitutional
analysis in Fox).
149. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568. The Court did not question the advertising's
relation to deception or illegal activity. Id. at 566.
150. Id. at 569 ("There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand
for electricity.").
151. Id. at 571. Justice Blackmun, writing separately, expressed his opinion that the test
adopted by the Court did "not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading,
non-coercive commercial speech," and argued that restriction of commercial speech should
not be allowed "absent clear and present danger." Id. at 573-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment).
152. 455 U.S. 191, 203-07 (1982).
153. Id. at 193-94. Rather than abandon the historical regime of restricting attorney
advertising, most states had adopted revised regulations thought to comply with the
Court's decision in Bates. The permissible media for attorney advertising were
newspapers, periodicals, and the yellow pages. Id. at 194. The categories of information
allowed were: "name, address and telephone number; areas of practice; date and place
of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for an initial
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attorneys wishing to advertise areas of practice were required to select
the advertisement's description from an enumerated list of practice
areas." Finally, the restriction allowed mailing of professional
announcement cards to " 'lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends, and relatives,'" but prohibited general mailings."5 The
attorney challenging the regulation had published advertisements that
listed unapproved areas of practice and other unpermitted infor-
mation-namely the courts before which the attorney was licensed to
practice.16 Additionally, the attorney had sent announcement cards
to persons outside of the permissible categories.5 7 Noting that the
Bates decision had emphasized that some regulation of attorney
advertising was still constitutionally acceptable, the Court subjected
the regulation to the commercial speech standard as set forth in
Central Hudson.5 1 The RMJ Court unanimously held the restric-
tions unconstitutional.5 9 Because none of the attorney's advertising
was misleading, the State's failure to assert a valid interest rendered
the regulation impermissible.'
Although the Court continued to propose a permissible realm of
regulation, the Court remained committed to its determination that
the First Amendment protected commercial speech and attorney
advertising. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,'6' the Court
clarified the requirements necessary for a commercial speech
restriction to survive this scrutiny. The regulation at issue prohibited
the mailing of " '[a]ny unsolicited advertisement of matter which is
designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception.' ,,162 The
Court accepted as substantial the government's asserted interest in
"aiding parents' efforts to discuss birth control with their
consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to
be charged for certain specified 'routine' legal services." Id. at 194.
154. Id. at 195.
155. Id. at 196 (quoting Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-102(A)(2) Mo. REV. STAT. (1978)
(Index Vol.)).
156. Id. at 198.
157. Md
158. Id. at 203-07.
159. Id at 207.
160. Id. at 204-07. Again, the Court observed that "[t]here may be other substantial
state interests.., that will support carefully drawn restrictions." Id. at 207.
161. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
162. Id at 61 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2)). The Postal Service had interpreted the
restriction not to apply to "advertisements in which the mailer has no commercial
interest." Id. at 62.
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children,"'" but concluded that the "marginal degree of protection
... achieved by purging all mailboxes of... material that is entirely
suitable for adults" did not warrant the restriction.'
14
Justice Rehnquist, writing separately, agreed that the restriction
had not been "adequately justified."'" Justice Rehnquist disagreed
with the majority's assessment of the government's asserted privacy
interest but conceded that "a mailed advertisement is significantly less
intrusive" than the invasions that had justified prior restrictions.' 66
Finally, Justice Stevens, also concurring in the judgment, felt that
when "offensiveness" is the governmental interest asserted, a
distinction between "offensive" content and "offensive" form was
necessary.67 He acknowledged that while restriction of a specific
viewpoint was improper, "regulations of form and context may strike
a constitutionally appropriate balance between the advocate's right to
convey a message and the recipient's interest in the quality of his
environment."1"
The Court had another opportunity to apply this developing
analysis to the attorney advertising context in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Council. 69 In violation of an Ohio regulation that
"forbade soliciting or accepting legal employment through adver-
tisements containing information or advice regarding specific legal
problems," the attorney had published a newspaper advertisement
advising that he was willing to represent women in claims against the
163. ld. at 73. The Court also considered and dismissed the government's asserted
interest in "shield[ing] recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to find
offensive." Noting that it had "never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow
of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended," the Court
reasoned that "the short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an
acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned." Id. at 71-72 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
164. Id. at 73-75. This is essentially an application of the requirement that commercial
speech restrictions directly advance the asserted interest. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct.
1792, 1800-01 (1993).
165. 463 U.S. at 80 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id. at 78 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist agreed
that the restriction did not directly advance the asserted state interest. Given his past
criticism of the Court's granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech, it is
interesting that Justice Rehnquist adjusted his analysis to encompass the recently adopted
doctrine.
167. Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
168. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens did not feel that
this was a regulation of "form and context." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
169. 471 U.S. 626 (1984) (plurality opinion).
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makers of the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device."0 The plurality
agreed that print advertising did not involve the dangers of over-
reaching, invasion of privacy, undue influence, and fraud, which were
presented by in-person solicitation. 17' Additionally, the plurality
found invalid the state's contention that the difficulty of differen-
tiating between deceptive and nondeceptive legal advertising justified
a prophylactic ban. 7 Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality
because of her concern that "the attorney's personal interest in
obtaining business may color the advice offered in soliciting a
client."'" In this regard, she felt that "permitting the use of legal
advice in advertisements will encourage lawyers to present that advice
most likely to bring potential clients into the office," a practice that
would implicate the same concerns for overreaching and undue
influence that justified the prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation
in Ohralik.74
The Court did, however, uphold a disclosure requirement relating
to litigation costs because it was reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers. As the Court had
previously suggested, regulations on attorney advertising that
"required [attorneys] to provide somewhat more information than
they might otherwise be inclined to present," might be permissible "in
170. IE at 639-40. Litigation concerning the Dalkon Shield was estimated at several
thousand cases. Id. at 640 n.10. The advertisement at issue successfully attracted 106
clients. Id- at 631.
171. Ld. at 641-42. The Court similarly dismissed the notion that advertising's allegedly
harmful effect of "stirring up" litigation could justify the restriction. Id. at 642-44.
172. Id. at 644-47 ("An attorney may not be disciplined for soliciting legal business
through printed advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive information and advice
regarding the legal rights of potential clients.").
173. lit at 674 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 678-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's invalidation of a
complete ban on the use of illustrations in legal advertising. ld. at 673 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The
majority held that the prohibition on illustration did not survive the protection afforded
to commercial speech for the same reason that the prohibition on "advice regarding
specific legal problems" failed-namely, the lack of a substantial state interest. Id. at 647-
49. In considering Ohio's interest in ensuring that attorneys act in a "dignified manner,"
the Court noticed some distinction between the strength of this argument as justification
for restriction on courtroom behavior and its strength with regard to restrictions on com-
munications with the public. Id The Court also reasoned that "the mere possibility that
some members of the population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot
justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some members of the
bar might find beneath their dignity." Id. at 648.
175. lit at 650-51.
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order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or decep-
tion."' 6 The Court observed that because the First Amendment's
protection of commercial speech was based primarily on its infor-
mational value, the constitutional protection for "not providing any
particular factual information in [legal] advertising is minimal.' '
The Court considered the constitutionality of a complete
prohibition on targeted direct-mail advertising by attorneys for
pecuniary gain in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association.'8 The
Court distinguished targeted direct-mail advertising from in-person
solicitation on the grounds that print advertising " 'poses much less
risk of overreaching and undue influence' ,,79 and does not
implicate the " 'regulatory difficulties' that are 'unique' to in-person
solicitation."' 8  The Court acknowledged the potential for an
"increased risk of deception" in letters that were "personalized"
rather than merely targeted, but felt that complete prohibition of
targeted direct-mail advertising was not justified. 81 The Court
suggested that the State could adopt a more narrow regulation aimed
at combating this danger, noting that "[t]he State can regulate such
abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive and more
precise means, the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to
file any solicitation letter with a state agency.'n 2
In dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for relying on
"the reasoning ... of cases built on defective premises," and
suggested that the Court reexamine its analytical framework."8
Justice O'Connor argued that the Central Hudson standard gave states
"considerable latitude to ban advertising that is potentially or
176. Id.
177. Id. at 651.
178. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). For a discussion of Shapero, see Ralph J. Mauro,
Constitutional Regulation of "Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation" by Attorneys After
Shapero-A Proposed Rule of Conduct, 34 VIL. L. REv. 281, 304-24 (1989).
179. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 642 (1984)). The Court also noted that "[a] letter, like a printed advertisement
(but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or
discarded." Id. at 475-76.
180. Id. at 476 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641 (1984)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor felt that targeted direct-
mail advertising wasdifferent from the newspaper advertising in Zauderer in that targeted
mailings were "more likely to overpower the will and judgment of laypeople" and were
"more likely than general advertisements to contain advice that is unduly tailored to serve
the pecuniary interests of the lawyer." Id. at 481-82 (O'Connor, I., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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demonstrably misleading, as well as truthful advertising that under-
mines the substantial government interest in promoting the high
ethical standards that are necessary in the legal profession. '114
Applying this reasoning, she argued that the Court's decision in Bates
v. State Bar s5 was inconsistent with her interpretation of the
analysis.ls 6
Although she acknowledged that some forms of legal advertising
might be protected, Justice O'Connor maintained that the complete
prohibition on targeted direct-mail advertising was justified by the
state's "substantial interest in preventing the potentially misleading
effects of targeted, direct-mail advertising as well as the corrosive
effects that such advertising can have on appropriate professional
standards."1" Ultimately, the dissent contended that "the relentless
natural force of economic self interest" necessitated "fairly severe
constraints on attorney advertising" to ensure compliance with the
"heightened ethical demands on [attorneys'] conduct towards those
they serve.'' l"
Thus, before the decision in Went For It, Inc., the Court had
developed a relatively defined framework within which to analyze the
constitutional validity of restrictions on legal advertising. In applying
the Central Hudson standard, the Court considered the interests
asserted by the state and determined if the regulations directly
advanced those interests in a manner that was not overly restrictive.
The Court repeatedly acknowledged as substantial the governmental
interests in preventing both overreaching and undue influence." 9
Other justifications had been unsuccessful." ° Advertising's alleged
184. Id at 485 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
186. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that advertising prices
for "routine" legal services is inherently misleading if "it fails to inform the potential
clients that they are not necessarily qualified" to evaluate whether their problems are
"routine").
187. IL at 486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. Id at 489-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("These demands are needed because
market forces, and the ordinary legal prohibitions against force and fraud, are simply
insufficient to protect the consumers ... from the peculiar power of the specialized
knowledge that these professionals possess.").
189. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-62 (1978).
190. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,476-77 (1988) (stating that
the regulatory difficulties presented by in-person solicitation do not apply to written
solicitation); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642-43 (1985)
(dismissing the "stirring up" of litigation as a justification for regulations); Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377-79 (1977) (dismissing advertising's alleged adverse effects on the
cost and quality of legal services as justifications for a prophylactic ban on attorney
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adverse effect on professionalism, strongly urged as an acceptable
justification by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor in
several dissents,'9' had been questioned and dismissed when
presented to the Court."9 Further, although given strong con-
sideration in other contexts, 93 the privacy interest implicated by
direct-mail advertisement of legal services and other products had
been an insufficient justification for content-based commercial speech
restrictions. 4 Within this limited framework, however, the opinions
of the Justices varied greatly; the many dissents illustrate a policy
disagreement respecting attorney advertising.9
The recent development and proliferation of permissible
advertising by the legal profession has been criticized by the general
public, the established bar,9 6 and even former Supreme Court Chief
advertising, and questioning the veracity of these assertions in general).
191. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 488-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[S]pecial ethical
standards for lawyers are properly understood as an appropriate means of restraining
lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably wield in a political system
like ours."); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 676-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 ("The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the
profession's failure to reach out and serve the community .... ."); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
647-48 ("[W]e are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in
their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the.
abridgment of their First Amendment rights.").
193. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800-02 (1993); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 484-85 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
194. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476. Although the Shapero Court did not squarely
confront the privacy issue, it observed that "[t]he invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer
discovers the recipient's legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the
discovery." IdM; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,72 ("[W]e have
never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to those who might
potentially be offended.").
195. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
673-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 440-46 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Bates, 433 U.S. at 389-404 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
id. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
196. See Re, supra note 3, at 98-104; Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of
Professionalism. The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 177, 190 (Nelson et al. eds., 1992)
The Georgia Committee on Professionalism singles out advertising as both
evidence of the decline of professionalism and a major cause of this decline:
"The Committee shares the remorse, indeed the indignation, of much of the bar
over the shameless commercialism of some advertising by lawyers. It is artless,
crude, and, in a word, unprofessional."
Id. Even a truly enlightening work, which recognizes the value of some advertising,
contains the ironic statement of an elderly attorney: " 'This was a better world and a
better profession ... when clients didn't know what other law firms charged and lawyers
didn't know what other lawyers made.' " SOL M. LiNowrrz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION
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Justice Warren Burger."9  A common theme among these
criticisms-and one particularly emphasized in the Court's decision in
Went For It, Inc.-is that attorney advertising has a detrimental effect
on "professionalism."'98  The heightened ethical standards that
govern attorneys are necessary to ensure that members of the legal
profession behave in a manner consistent with their stated dedication
to public service and the administration of justice. Advertising, it is
generally argued, adversely effects the reputation of the bar, thus
lowering public confidence in the legal system. 9 Further, although
the Court has decided the constitutionality of several forms of
attorney advertising, there remains a virtual consensus on the part of
established members of the legal profession that advertising is beneath
the professional dignity of attorneys. Both the traditional prohibitions
and the natural inclination toward self-preservation may contribute to
32 (1994).
197. See Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 949
(1995).
198. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376-81; see Burger, supra note 197; Nelson &
Trubek, supra note 196, at 191 ("[O]ne could argue that for many bar leaders the problem
of professionalism would be solved if tasteless advertising and overzealous litigation could
be controlled."); Robert D. Peltz, LegalAdvertising-Opening Pandora's Box, 19 STETSON
L. REv. 43, 116 (1989).
199. See Kathy Sawyer, Lawyers Compound Disaster Grief, Complaints of Ambulance-
Chasing After Dallas Jet Crash Probed, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1985, at A14 ("[C]ritics and
supporters agree that unseemly behavior by a few reinforces the stereotype of all lawyers
as callous, money-grubbing vultures."); Neil T. Shayne, Advertising by Lawyers, N.Y. LJ.,
Apr. 10,1990, at 3 (discussing some unappealing methods of attorney advertising involving
the gas leak in Bhopal, India, the use of obituary pages for mailing lists, and describing the
verbal exchange in one television commercial: "A convict in a prison uniform is led down
a long hallway by two guards. The chaplain asks, 'Any last words my son?' The convict
looks skyward and says, 'Yes, I wish I had called the legal clinic.' ").
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this attitude.3 An analysis of the decision in 'Went For It, Ina
reveals the persuasiveness of this ideology.
In applying the Central Hudson test to the Florida Bar's
prohibition on direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their
families for a period of thirty days following an accident, the majority
found that the regulation was supported by the substantial
government interests in protecting victims' privacy and maintaining
professionalism."' The majority relied heavily on a compilation of
statistical and anecdotal evidence prepared for the Florida Bar in
making the determination that the regulation was a reasonably
restrictive means of directly advancing these interests.' 2 The
context of the Court's previous statements concerning the validity of
the asserted privacy interest,' when coupled with the reality that
200. Another possible impetus behind the opposition to lawyer advertising can be found
in Hazard et al., supra note 12, at 1112:
If the advertising problem were only one of economic competition within the bar,
however, it might not have generated such heated controversy. One must look
deeper, even if only to speculate. Perhaps the underlying anxiety about
advertising stems from its tendency to portray legal services as a "business"
rather than a "profession." Of course, the practice of law manifestly is both a
profession and a business, and a highly competitive business at that. Why the
passion to deny its character as a business? The answer derives from the notion,
basic to our legal ideals, that justice cannot be sold. This notion is central to the
ideology of the bar. A group for which that notion is so important inevitably
would find it difficult to recognize that access to justice is in any sense a question
of buying and selling. Nevertheless, lawyers differ in skill, knowledge, and the
time they can devote to a case, and individuals with more resources are usually
able to purchase both a superior lawyer and more of his time. Therefore,
justice-actual outcomes in the legal system-is related to the quality of
lawyering that a client can afford; justice at the margin can often be bought.
Professor Hazard recognized that advertising's exposure of this contrast between the ideal
and the reality makes the legal profession uncomfortable, but he dismissed the possibility
that advertising itself might widen the gap. Id. at 1112-13.
201. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376-81.
202. Id at 2377-79.
203. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1802-04 (1993) (striking a prohibition on
in-person solicitation by accountants, but recognizing as substantial the state's interest in
protecting its citizens from solicitation that would "intimidate, vex, or harass the
recipient"); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (upholding a content-neutral
prohibition on residential picketing due to the state's substantial interest in protecting the
domicile); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (striking a prohibition on residential
picketing as content-based despite recognition that "protecting the well-being, tranquility,
and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order"); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (dismissing the state's assertion that a ban on
potentially offensive contraceptive material was supported by an interest in protecting
recipients' privacy and stating that "[r]ecipients of objectionable mailings ... 'may
effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes' ").
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the thrust of the data relied upon was aimed at legal advertising's
negative effect on public opinion,2" indicates that the majority's
opinion was motivated by its desire to preserve professionalism within
the legal practice. 5
Although general political processes in our country are governed
democratically, it is unlikely the Court, or organized bar associations,
would support basing the ethical standards of the legal profession on
public opinion. Given the average layperson's limited knowledge
regarding legal processes, this idea instantly appears unwise. Yet the
Court gave strong consideration to the public opinion survey that
indicated that attorney advertising was viewed by some members of
the general public as an invasion of privacy and as a practice that
diminishes respect for the legal profession.2 6
The plight of recent accident victims and their families deserves
recognition. Indeed, it is the distinguishing factor in the Court's
decision that the regulation was constitutionally permissible.'
While the states' interest in protecting against offensive mailings had
been considered previously, the compelling situation that the
Florida Bar sought to protect, and the time limit, made this regulation
somewhat different than the complete prohibition on direct-mail
advertising in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association.209 To assume
that this distinction was the primary basis for the decision in Went For
It, Inc., however, would be to ignore the underlying motivation to
protect the dignity of the legal profession.210
204. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
205. This notion is supported by the majority's statement that the regulation in Went
For 14 Inc. was different from the one stricken in Bolger because the harm targeted was
not the offense, but the consequent injury to the legal profession. See Lawyer Solicitation:
Does It Invade Privacy?, N.J. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 25 (reprint of commentary of Eugene
Volokh, acting professor, UCLA School of Law) (recognizing that this distinction
essentially reduces the asserted privacy interest to the protection of professionalism).
206. Went For 14 Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2377-79.
207. Id. at 2378-79.
208. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1982) (holding that
the asserted state interest of protecting mail recipients from material they might find
offensive was insufficient justification for a complete prohibition on the mailing of
contraceptive advertisements).
209. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
210. Before subjecting the regulation to the Central Hudson analysis, the majority
acknowledged that the restriction was an "effort to protect the flagging reputations of
Florida lawyers by preventing" conduct that the Florida Bar felt was " 'deplorable and
beneath common decency.' " Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Brief for
Petitioner 28 (quoting In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270, cert. denied, 504 U.S. 956 (1992))).
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In regard to the Florida Bar's asserted interest in protecting the
privacy of recent accident victims and their families, the majority
found precedential recognition of the need to preserve the " 'well-
being, tranquility, and privacy of the home.' ,,"" Repeatedly
acknowledged in the context of content-neutral time, place and
manner restrictions, the heightened protection afforded the homestead
has generally been justification for restricting forms of communication
that are offensive, rather than restricting communication with
offensive content. As the dissent noted, the Court has explicitly
refused to justify restrictions on speech on the basis that the idea itself
might offend the listener .2 ' Further, in considering prohibitions of
direct-mail solicitation in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association"1 4
and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,.15 the Court noted the
ease with which mail recipients could avoid potentially offensive
material simply by throwing it away.216 This implicit protection of
mail recipients was enhanced by an unchallenged Florida Bar
regulation that required attorneys' solicitation letters to bear the
marking "advertising material" in red.21  Thus, the state's interest
in protection of privacy appears to be of little import.
Further, the evidence supporting a conclusion that the regulations
directly and materially advanced the privacy interest was not
overwhelming. In addition to the dissent's criticisms of the presented
211. 1& (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
212. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,81-89 (1949) (upholding a restriction on the use
of sound trucks to disseminate opinions). In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), Justice Stevens wrote:
[A] communication may be offensive in two different ways. Independently of the
message the speaker intends to convey, the form of his communication may be
offensive-perhaps because it is too loud or too ugly in a particular setting....
The fact that the offensive form of some communication may subject it to
appropriate regulation surely does not support the conclusion that the offensive
character of an idea can justify an attempt to censor its expression.
Ld- at 546-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76 (1983); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)).
214. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
215. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
216. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-76; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (stating that recipients of objectionable mailings could "avoid further bom-
bardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes").
217. See McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1042 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7A(b)(2)(A)), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)).
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survey's lack of statistical definition,"' the statistics themselves are
unimpressive. Of the statistics cited by the majority, the two related
to the privacy interest are: twenty-six percent of a random sampling
of people who had received direct-mail advertising by lawyers in 1987
thought it was an invasion of privacy and fifty-four percent of the
general population surveyed felt the same.219 While the first statistic
suggests that direct-mail advertising may implicate a privacy interest,
it is interesting that actual direct mail recipients were less than half as
likely as the general population to feel that the practice was an
invasion of privacy.' The effect on the general population's
opinion seems to be more persuasive to the Court than the reality
that actual recipients were more amenable to the practice after
receiving the letters. This contrast indicates that recipients often
benefit from direct mail solicitation, or at least that they perceive the
practice more positively after they experience it."
Somewhat more related to the privacy interest is the anecdotal
evidence presented by the Florida Bar, which cataloged the comments
of several direct-mail recipients who were angered by the
solicitation.2'  Essentially, however, the brunt of this information
was aimed at correlating direct-mail solicitation and declining public
opinion of the legal profession.' Thus, the majority's opinion must
have been strongly influenced by the public's negative view of the
practice of direct-mail solicitation.
218. Went For It, Ina, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra notes 68-70
and accompanying text (noting several of Justice Kennedy's objections to the survey).
219. Id. at 2377. Other statistics showed that 34% of direct-mail recipients found it
annoying or irritating and 24% said they were angered. Id.
220. Cf. James Podgers, Image Problem: Burned by the Fall in Public Favor, the
Organized Bar Turns Up the Heat on Lawyer Advertising, 80 A.B.A. J. 66, 68 (Feb. 1994)
(discussing the results of a Gallup poll of 400 random ABA members and noting that "a
whopping 87 percent of the respondents said they believe advertising has a negative effect
on the image of the legal profession").
221. The irony apparent from this situation, which the majority failed to recognize, is
that this evidence, offered to sustain the validity of the Florida Bar's asserted privacy
interest, impeaches the validity of the 30-day ban as an effective means of promoting the
reputation of the legal profession.
222. Id.. at 2377-78; see supra note 39 (providing examples of citizen comments).
223. For an interesting critique of the Supreme Court's evidentiary requirements
regarding justifications for restrictions on speech by attorneys, see Snyder, supra note 36,
at 357-60 (arguing that decisions are often based on policy opinions and speculation rather
than empirical data). Interestingly, none of the statistical or anecdotal data relied upon
by the majority indicated that attorneys participating in direct-mail solicitation engaged in
unethical behavior or that the practice of direct-mail solicitation encouraged such behavior.
See Went For It, Ina, 115 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
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The strong consideration of the legal profession's image is not
surprising in light of the constant criticism that influential members of
the established bar direct toward advertisersP" More important,
however, is the possibility that a majority of the Court might agree
that protecting the dignity and reputation of the legal profession is an
acceptable justification for restricting attorney advertising. In the
past, Justice O'Connor contended that the states have a valid interest
in regulating professions.' Her persistent adherence to this belief,
consistently joined by conservative members of the Court, gener-
ally focused on the "enhanced possibility for confusion and deception
in marketing professional services" and the danger that the "attor-
ney's personal interest in obtaining business [might] color the advice
offered in soliciting a client."' However, in Went For It, Inc the
proposed communication's potential for creating these dangers was
not at issue. Rather, the "erosion of confidence in the profession"
allegedly caused by direct-mail solicitation appears to be the most
influential factor in the majority's decision.2
224. See Burger, supra note 197, at 953-57; Nelson & Trubek, supra note 196, at 190
("[L]eaders of the bar seem to agree about what specific conduct constitutes 'unprofession-
al' behavior: advertising and litigation 'abuse.' "); Re, supra note 3, at 98-104.
225. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1804 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In
my view the States have the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech that, albeit
not directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's membership in a
learned profession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at large."); Peel
v. Attorney Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 119 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Failure to accord States considerable latitude in this area embroils this Court in the
micromanagement of the State's inherent authority to police the ethical standards of the
profession within its borders."); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 487 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The roots of the error in our attorney advertising cases are
a defective analogy between professional services and standardized consumer products and
a correspondingly inappropriate skepticism about the States' justifications for their
regulation."); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 676 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) ("In my view, state regulation of professional advice in advertisements is qualitatively
different from regulation of claims concerning commercial goods and merchandise, and is
entitled to greater deference than the majority's analysis would permit.").
226. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 119 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same);
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist).
227. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 674 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
228. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2381. It should be noted that Justice Breyer was
the swing vote in this decision. At least one commentator has suggested that his decision
to join the majority was predicated on the privacy interest. Lawyer Solicitation: Does It
Invade Privacy?, N.J. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 25 (reprinting online Lexis Counsel Connect
comments made by Peter Strauss, professor, Columbia University School of Law).
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Indeed, the majority candidly recognized that the actual harm the
Florida Bar sought to prevent was not the invasion of privacy, but
rather the "outrage and irritation with the state licensed legal
profession" caused by direct-mail solicitation.229 This harm could
not be avoided by throwing the letter away, because the "simple
receipt" of such an advertisement was enough to elicit contempt and
distrust for the legal profession."3  This concern is certainly
predicated on the traditional notion of legal professionalism. When
lawyers behave in an unprofessional manner, public confidence in and
respect for the legal profession decline, and, the argument goes, the
vitality of our legal system will suffer a corresponding decline. On its
face, this argument is entirely plausible; without competent, trustwor-
thy, and ethical legal representation, citizens would be unable to
exercise the very legal rights upon which the system is based. In this
regard, true professionalism is required to sustain our justice system.
The problem encountered in Went For It, Ina is the origin of the
definition of true professionalism. The Florida Bar's interpretation of
professionalism places high value on the reputation of its mem-
bers."' While competent practice and ethical dedication deserve a
high degree of respect, the dynamics of the legal profession-an
atmosphere fraught with conflict and controversy-have historically
subjected attorneys to public criticism. 2  The representation of
unpopular clients, the adversarial nature of court proceedings, and the
high fees accompanying legal representation are examples of
professional behavior that contribute to the general public's poor
opinion of the legal profession. A regulation aimed at improving this
opinion can be only marginally successful because some segment of
society will be unhappy with the legal profession at any given time.
Additionally, the wisdom behind a scheme to improve public opinion
is questionable: Is the legal profession guided by the opinion of
229. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2379; see supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text
(noting the inconsistency between evidence presented in support of the privacy interest
and the conclusion drawn).
230. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
231. The Florida Bar commissioned a public opinion survey to determine advertising's
effect on public attitudes regarding the legal profession and, based on the survey's results,
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to amend regulations on attorney advertising. Went
For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2374 (citing The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990)).
232. See Re, supra note 3, at 86 (citing EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENT (1770), and Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 395 (1906), for the
proposition that dissatisfaction with the legal profession is "as old as the law itself").
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society? The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated by
the American Bar Association, are silent as to a lawyer's obligations
with regard to his popularity.3  Instead, the Model Rules em-
phasize the lawyer's duty to public service and the administration of
justice.'
The fact that Went For It, Inc. was motivated entirely by
financial self-interest does not necessarily indicate that its use of
direct-mail solicitation is inconsistent with professionalism. 5 The
provision of legal services to those without ready access to legal
representation is consistent with professional values. As noted by the
dissent, direct solicitation "may serve vital purposes and promote the
administration of justice. '"" Particularly benefited by direct-mail
solicitation are those who lack exposure to the legal system and who
are in need of timely representation. 7 Other parties with better
access to legal representation, as well as their insurance companies,
are able to contact accident victims in the immediate aftermath of the
accident; but attorneys wishing to provide them with legal advice are
prohibited from doing so."2 Further, the fact that Florida attorneys
were sending over 280,000 letters per year 9 to accident victims or
their families indicates that many recipients found the services offered
by the direct-mail solicitors valuable; if recipients did not respond to
the letters, the economic incentive for direct-mail solicitation would
be removed and the practice would probably cease.24 It is ironic
233. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1994).
234. Id at Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities.
235. As the Court noted in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-69 (1977), attorneys
earn their livelihood at the bar, and thus much legal work is the product of self-interest.
236. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
237. See Snyder, supra note 36, at 385-86. The dissent argued that the restriction
upheld in Went For 14 Inc. would prejudice the rights of victims in need of legal
representation. 115 S. Ct. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Regarding minor injuries, the
dissent argued that victims unaware of the possibility of a legal claim would be harmed by
the restriction. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Likewise, in the case of major injuries,
victims "too ill-informed to know that time is of the essence" would be prejudiced. Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
238. See Went For 14 Inc, 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the
urgent need for legal representation immediately following an accident); see also Monroe
H. Freedman, Advertising and Soliciting: The Case for Ambulance Chasing, in VERDICTS
ON LAWYERS 94, 94 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) (describing the facts of
Gunn v. Washek, 176 A.2d 635 (Pa. 1961), a case in which a young boy's claim against a
negligent driver was barred by the statute of limitations after his mother unwittingly relied
on the assurance of an insurance adjuster that no attorney was necessary).
239. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2377.
240. Further, as noted by Justice Kennedy in dissent, the practice is self-policing in that
"[p]otential clients will not hire lawyers who offend them." It. at 2385 (Kennedy, J.,
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that these benefits of direct mail solicitation were overshadowed by
the Florida Bar's interest in maintaining "professionalism.""24 As
noted by Justice Kennedy in dissent, an essential link is missing in the
chain that supposedly connects direct-mail solicitation with a decline
in professionalism.242 Unethical behavior will surely result in both a
decreasing reputation and a loss of efficacy within the legal system.
Because public opinion of the legal profession is adversely affected by
some practice, however, does not mean that the practice is inherently
unethical. Careful consideration, far beyond the superficial inquiry by
the layperson, is necessary to determine the proper standards within
the profession. The formation of these standards must be guided not
by an interest in popularity, but by the profession's primary objec-
tive-to provide legal services to the public.
In light of the Went For It, Inc. majority's protection of the
dignity and reputation of the legal profession, the future of currently
permissible forms of attorney advertising is questionable. If the
public's negative opinion of direct-mail solicitation of accident victims
persuades the Court to allow this severe infringement of attorneys'
First Amendment liberties, restrictions on other forms of attorney
dissenting).
241. Another group that will feel the impact of this regulation is the small practitioner.
See Lawyer Solicitation: Does It Invade Privacy?, N.J. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 25, 41
(reprinting online Lexis Counsel Connect comments made by solo practitioner Don
Boswell of Palm Beach, Florida). Mr. Boswell's stated:
By prohibiting [direct-mail] contact within this period, the only firms that will
contact an accident victim, albeit indirectly, are those that are already spending
fortunes on TV and Yellow Pages advertising, and those that wine and dine
emergency room physicians, EMS personnel, tow-truck drivers, and police
officers, and employ various other methods of attracting business. At least, direct
mail contact allowed an inexpensive way (and much more ethical than giving
cards to ER does, etc.) for small firms to compete with the big boys. Once again,
the Florida Bar is out to protect the already established firms, and the Supreme
Court has just given it a stamp of approval. Neither really cares about the
consumers.
Id.; see also Lisa Brennan, The Enemies of Lawyer Advertising: Other Lawyers, N.J. L.J.,
May 22, 1995, at 5. Ms. Brennan reported the views of one attorney:
"Many of the most bitter opponents of lawyer ads are lawyers at big firms that
put lots of money into separate marketing departments," says David Vladeck,
lead counsel at the Public Citizens Litigation Group in Washington. "Lawyers
ads make [lawyers] feel like shoe salesmen, but their firms are doing the same
thing on a grander scale. It's sheer hypocrisy."
Id
242. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
criticized the Florida Bar for "manipulating the public's opinion by suppressing speech that
informs us how the legal system works." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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advertising may be supported by a similar rationale.243 It is more
likely, however, that the compelling situation of recent accident
victims and their families enabled the majority to secure the swing
vote that it needed. Justice O'Connor did not criticize the Court's
analytical framework for regulations on legal advertising, or the
precedents within that framework, as she had done in the past.2'
Instead, while clearly holding the protection of the profession's image
to be a valid justification, she also invoked the asserted privacy
interest. If the particularly sympathetic state of recent accident
victims and their families was the factor that persuaded Justice Breyer
to join Justice O'Connor,45 then protection of professional dignity
may not be a valid justification for other restraints on attorney
advertising. Several states have responded to the Went For It, Inc.
decision by considering the enactment of similar temporary bans on
direct-mail solicitation of accident victims.' 4  For example, the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar approved for publication a
proposed amendment to the North Carolina Rules of Professional
Conduct that would expand the thirty-day ban to cover not only
accident victims, but any person" 'the lawyer knows or should know
243. For example, if the public finds that certain television commercials denigrate the
profession's reputation, the majority's rationale indicates that increased restrictions would
be appropriate. Cf. Cyberspeak Voices from the Reader Network, NETWORK WORLD,
May 23, 1994, at 7 (listing opinions of Internet users with regard to legal advertising over
the information superhighway).
244. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("I agree with the Court that the reasoning in Zauderer supports the conclusion
reached today. That decision, however, was itself the culmination of a line of cases built
on defective premises and flawed reasoning.").
245. This is indicated simply by its inclusion in the majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor's professed belief that consumers would not "benefit from a constitutional
theory that refuses to recognize either the essence of professionalism or its fragile and
necessary foundation" suggests that the privacy interest was unnecessary to her decision.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246. See, e.g., Rocco Cammarere, New Ambulance-Chasing Prohibitions on the Way,
N.J. LAW., July 31, 1995, at 1 (stating that the only issues concerning the inevitable ban
in New Jersey are "who will do the banning-the New Jersey Supreme Court or the State
Legislature-and the duration of the cooling off period"); Mark A. Cohen, MBA May
Seek 30-Day Ban on PI Solicitation, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 10,1995, at 1 (describing the
Massachusetts Bar Association's serious consideration of the 30-day "waiting period").
Meanwhile, states that have already enacted rules similar to Florida Bar's should succeed
at the appellate level if they can muster evidentiary support to sustain a claim of
governmental interest in protecting the privacy of citizens. See Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d
358, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1995). In Moore, the Fifth Circuit applied the Went For It, Inc
analysis to Texas' asserted interest of protecting privacy and found the evidence submitted
by the state sufficient to justify a similar 30-day direct-mail restriction. Id. The state did
not assert, and the court did not address, legal professionalism.
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... may be in need of legal services in a particular matter unless the
event giving rise to the need for legal services occurred more than
thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication.' ,247 It is
unlikely that such a wide-sweeping restriction would be justified by a
privacy interest similar to that asserted in Went For It, Inc. due to its
inclusion of far less serious invasions.248 The Court should not
permit reputational concerns to sustain such serious infringement of
First Amendment rights.
By allowing the Florida Bar to justify its standards with its
professed concern for the reputation of its members, the Court
overestimated both the importance of and the potential for the legal
profession's popularity within the community. Given that some level
of dissatisfaction is a function of the system itself, Justice Kennedy
argued that the best way to improve the professional image of
attorneys was to improve the "substance of its practice."249 True
professionalism requires that " 'the ethical standards of lawyers are
linked to the service and protection of clients.' "" By protecting
the "flagging reputations" of Florida attorneys, the regulation at issue
in Went For It, Inc prevents potential clients from receiving informa-
tion necessary to assert their legal rights. This unseemly justification
suggests that the Florida Bar is willing to sacrifice the legal claims of
injured parties to ensure its own popularity.
TODD MITCHELL
247. Council Proposes Change to Mail Solicitation Rule, N.C. ST. B. NEWSL., Fall 1995
at 1, 8. The Council has also approved funding for a public-opinion survey to determine
"[t]he effect of lawyer solicitation and advertising on privacy interests and the reputation
of the bar," the results of which will be used to guide decisions relating to ultimate
revisions. Id at 8.
248. See id. at 8. For example, a recipient of a traffic citation seems much less likely
to view a letter from an attorney as an invasion of his privacy than the family of an
accident victim, yet both letters would be prohibited by the proposed amendment.
249. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n 436 U.S. 447,461
(1978)).
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